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EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS OF TWENTY-FIVE
YEARS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: WHERE




I will disclaim at the outset any pretense of writing a scholarly, sub-
stantive article. I have more than enough of those to my credit. This
Essay will look at environmental law and its practitioners in broad,
somewhat subjective, terms.
The year 1994 marks not only the twenty-fifth anniversary of envi-
ronmental law in this country, but it also happens to be the twenty-fifth
anniversary of my own involvement with the discipline. In the fall of
1969 I became, as a fledgling New Hampshire state assistant attorney
general, counsel to and sole litigator for all of the state's environmental
agencies. In those days, we were still trying to enforce water quality
standards and air pollution control was a matter of enforcing the law of
nuisance. It was not until two years later that there was a sufficient
number of more-or-less full-time environmental lawyers in state govern-
ment to enable the formation of an environmental committee of the Na-
tional Association of Attorneys General.
Although there are many differences between environmental law in
its early years and environmental law in 1994, two things stand out as
indicative of the fundamental differences between then and now. In the
United States, environmental law has become an essential, ingrained ele-
ment of mainstream corporate law, and a body of environmental law is
present in most of the developed nations of the world. Obviously, neither
was the case twenty-five years ago, despite the lofty rhetoric at the ambi-
tious but premature Stockholm Conference on the Environment; how-
ever, these two facts illustrate better than any others that a discipline
* Partner, Dewey Ballantine, New York. Mr. Stever heads the firm's Environmental
Practice Group. He has previously been a professor of law, teaching various environmental
law topics, head of two environmental litigation sections in the United States Department of
Justice, and a state assistant attorney general in charge of environmental litigation. He is the
author of numerous articles and several books, including the treatise, Law of Chemical Regula-
tion and Hazardous Waste. He has practiced environmental law full-time since 1971.
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considered important only to a few lawyers twenty-five years ago has
matured into big business.
One illustrative example of the globalization of environmental law is
the Environmental Law Institute's Gulf of the Aqaba Project.' This re-
markable effort produced, during 1993, a cooperative agreement among
Israel and its Arab neighbors to collaboratively address pollution
problems affecting this shared resource.
In this Essay I will discuss the process by which decisions are made
under the environmental laws. I will consider the institutions that play
major roles in the formation and implementation of environmental pol-
icy, and will comment on the environmental legal profession as it has
evolved to the present day.
II. THOUGHTS ON THE EVOLUTION OF SUBSTANTIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
The enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA)2 was significant as the first serious legislative attempt to reorder
the thought processes at work in planning and executing large govern-
ment projects. Environmental impact assessment has since become a
global process. It is a matter of no small interest that NEPA may ulti-
mately be judged to have had a more profound impact on international
finance than it has had on governmental and business decision making in
the United States. It does not appear to have had any significant direct
effect on the quality of the environment either in the United States or
elsewhere.
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 19703 mark the beginning of the
more interesting social experiment that we call environmental regulation
in this country. In retrospect, federalization of the control of environ-
mental pollution drove government deeper into the fabric of socioeco-
nomic enterprise than any prior set of government regulatory programs,
more so than all of the programs of the New Deal.
In order for a government to control human conduct successfully,
particularly conduct that has heretofore been unregulated and is an in-
1. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., PROTECTING THE GULF OF AQABA: A REGIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE (Deborah Sandler ed., 1993). The year 1994 is also the
twenty-fifth anniversary of the Environmental Law Institute, a unique and important nonprofit
organization for which I have been privileged to serve both as a contributing lawyer and mem-
ber of the Board of Directors over the last decade.
2. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 432 1-
4370d (West 1985 & Supp. 1993)).
3. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
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grained component of the wealth production, those charged with setting
the rules must (1) make intelligent policy choices; (2) make the rules
clear and understandable; and (3) be prepared to vigorously redress fail-
ures to adhere to the new rules of conduct. If such programs are ex-
pected to cause economic dislocation or otherwise have an impact on the
internal dynamics of segments of the market economy, then the nature
and extent of the effect, and whether causing the effect is necessary,
should be clearly understood before the course of action is undertaken.
None of the federal environmental laws enacted after 1970 and none
of the programs set up to administer them have been fully successful
when analyzed against the three criteria. Measured against physically
ascertainable goals (such as whether the air is cleaner, the surface water
purer, et cetera), our system of environmental laws comes up short in
many respects. Perhaps the greatest success has been achieved in con-
trolling the business of hazardous waste disposal. However, that success
has come with a significant economic cost and with a gross misapplica-
tion of resources on the problems perceived to be associated with for-
merly disposed hazardous waste.
III. A SHORT LIST OF THINGS WE HAVE LEARNED AND OTHER
OBSERVATIONS FROM THE LAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The following list is subjective. It contains, in some cases, paren-
thetical observations drawn from my own experience. I have attempted
to draw conclusions from environmental policy enforcement, and from
decision making since 1969. The list is not exhaustive, and is doubtless
different in many respects from someone else's list. Some of the subjects
are further elaborated upon later in the Essay, others are not.
(1) Environmental decision making at the federal level is cumber-
some even without post decision judicial review.
(2) There has been more citizen participation in environmental de-
cision making than in any other area of governmental policy making.
(3) The slow pace of environmental rule making and the heavy de-
gree of citizen participation has not seemed to produce a substantively
better body of decisions. However, the process is justifiable because it
tends to move all complex government decisions toward consensus-
even though consensus is rarely achieved.
(4) Too little money and too few government resources have been
spent on water and air pollution.
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(5) A disproportionate amount of private capital and government
resources have been expended on cleaning up old hazardous waste dispo-
sal sites with little direct evidence of significant environmental benefit.
(6) Arguably, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)4 has had a more significant en-
vironmental benefit indirectly than directly. The fear of CERCLA
liability by financial institutions and industrial property owners has pro-
duced a massive amount of voluntary site assessment and remedial action
within the last decade. Such activity normally occurs in connection with
and as a result of debt restructuring or the sale of industrial assets.
(7) The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) attempt at
chemical product regulation under the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA)5 has been an environmental failure. The program has essentially
been an exercise in information gathering, paper shuffling, and enforce-
ment for the sake of maintaining the integrity of the program. It has,
however, resulted in the creation of an enormous chemical and toxicolog-
ical data base, which, when properly used, is of value both to industry
and government. In order to be viable, the TSCA program needs to be
better focused and its goals more clearly explicated.
(8) The EPA's pesticide regulatory program has been a substantive
failure, not because of any fault on the part of the EPA but because of the
structure and standards contained in the governing legislation. Congress
missed an opportunity to improve this program when it amended the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)6 in 1988.
(9) In general, neither the EPA nor state environmental agencies
have been a particularly good judge of public health or environmental
risk. They have tended to magnify programmatic responses to risks that
are, at the moment, perceived as significant by Congress or the general
public irrespective of the true nature of the risk when judged apolitically
and in the context of sound scientific methodologies. This failure, how-
ever, seems to be an expected byproduct of our political system.
(10) Laws containing prohibitions, government permit controls,
and performance or behavior norms have not proven to be universally
successful in addressing problems of environmental contamination.
However, as in the case of voluntary remediation in the face of an ineffec-
tive Superfund program, the presence of sometimes ineffective or mis-
guided environmental regulatory laws has spawned creative avoidance
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
5. 15 U.S.C §§ 2601-2671 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
6. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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strategies that have occasionally resulted in dramatic reductions in pollu-
tion or the generation of waste.
(11) I have observed that government regulatory personnel find it
particularly difficult to negotiate or accept creative solutions to compli-
ance or pollution problems. This difficulty appears to be related to two
things: (a) a slavish adherence to the notion that all regulated entities
should be more or less treated alike; and (b) what seems to be a need to
follow the "cookbook." This may be a result of the decline in the overall
experience level of regulatory agency personnel as private sector opportu-
nities for government-trained environmental professionals increased, par-
ticularly for engineers. As a practitioner who represents industry, I
would much rather deal with very experienced, very well-trained, expert
government adversaries. The omnipresent threat of congressional "over-
sight"-read, political embarrassment-has also tended to promote the
"cookbook approach," that is, the application of environmental stan-
dards or enforcement policies in a way that treats truly disparate circum-
stances as though they were the same.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING
Because the federal environmental laws were originally structured
as command and control laws,' the approach taken by administrative
agencies charged with developing programs is the critical element of the
system. The basic decision-making framework is one in which adminis-
trative agencies make the critical judgments and provide notice to the
public, affording limited opportunity for comment." The enormous and
difficult rule-making obligations imposed by the major environmental
laws enacted between 1970 and 1976 were bound to, and in fact did,
affect the shape of administrative law.
Administrative agencies had been issuing legislative rules and adju-
dicative orders consistently since the 1950s. Those activities had been
relatively noncontroversial, at least in the sense that the citizen move-
ment was less organized and sophisticated than the environmental move-
ment which actively participated in rule making and had the money and
public backing to challenge agency decisions. The massive outpouring of
rules by the EPA between 1972 and 1982 threatened economic repercus-
7. Command and control statutes, which have their modem origin in the New Deal legis-
lation of the 1930s and 1940s, generally announce the formation of a program in rather un-
detailed terms-the "command"-and delegate to an administrative agency the task of putting
flesh on the skeleton, essentially both creating specific policy and implementing it-the
"control".
8. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-576, 701-706 (1988).
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sions of sufficient magnitude to alter the competitive landscape of major
segments of American industry. By the same token those rules would
spell the success or failure of each environmental program, because sub-
stantive-that is, political-guidance provided by Congress in the origi-
nal Clean Air Act,9 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,10 and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)II was limited
and not particularly clear. The stakes for all interested sides of the policy
issues were huge.
Although they did not have to do so, the rule writers at the EPA
chose to create an entirely new vocabulary of jargon by inventing a veri-
table torrent of acronyms. 2 It is not surprising, therefore, though I con-
tinue to think it unfortunate,13 that the federal judiciary chose largely to
demur when asked by the challengers to the first and second round of
environmental regulations to carefully consider the substance of what the
EPA had done. The Supreme Court's Chevron decision," the last in a
series of administrative law decisions by the Court on environmental
rules, largely rendered efforts to attack the reasonableness or substantive
soundness of the EPA's rules futile. In retrospect, the Chevron decision
could result in long-term reduction of the quality of executive environ-
mental policy making because it allows Agency decisions based on poor
logic and questionable assumptions to withstand legal challenge, so long
as the Agency followed the correct procedures.
Of course the EPA, and for that matter state agencies as well, often
make soundly reasoned, credible policy and technical decisions. None-
theless, not all of the important environmental decisions have been well
thought out, and in some cases the economic cost of some of the mistakes
to the private sector has been very high. Moreover, I cannot help but
think that some of the poorer policy decisions made by the Agency over
the years might have been better if the Agency's management knew that
its decisions would be subjected to meaningful substantive judicial scru-
tiny-that it would not only have to meet the standard of not acting
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
10. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993).
11. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992k (West 1983 & Supp. 1993).
12. Mastery of these acronyms quickly became a de facto credential for any practitioner
claiming to be an environmental lawyer. Attendance by an uninitiated novice at the Keystone
Conference on Environmental Law would present the hapless individual with an incomprehen-
sible cacophony of acronyms and technobabble.
13. Donald W. Stever, Jr., Deference to Administrative Agencies in Federal Environmental,
Health and Safety Litigation-Thoughts on Varying Judicial Application of the Rule, 6 W.
NEw ENG. L. REv. 35 (1983).
14. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
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arbitrarily, but also that its decisions would be premised on scientific
opinion and supported by the factual record.
The standard against which most federal and state agency rule-mak-
ing decisions are judged is that the agency has "considered" all relevant
issues presented to it, and that it has not acted out of whim or fancy.
This does not promote scientifically defensible decisions. Scientific judg-
ment lies at the heart of many environmental decisions; however, the
EPA often is not presented with or cannot develop adequate data. Al-
lowing the EPA to predicate decisions on questionable science enables
the Agency to make decisions where it might otherwise face decisional
gridlock.
The courts have been particularly unwilling to hold the EPA to a
rigorous standard of proof on the issue of scientific judgment. This reluc-
tance has periodically produced suggestions that a technologically liter-
ate "science court" be set up to address environmental issues. This idea
was last raised seriously (and dismissed) during the late 1970s, but I sus-
pect that it may be ready for a revival. As a government lawyer in the
1970s, I was opposed to the idea. Now I am beginning to think that it
might be worth a try. My hesitation is primarily due to my experience
before Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards during the latter years of
nuclear power plant licensing. These panels were established on the
model of marrying substantive and legal expertise into a three-member
panel consisting of a lawyer and two scientists. In the contested licensing
cases I participated in or observed, the caliber of decision making by
those boards did not seem to be better than could have been done by a
competent judge or judicial officer.
There are many examples of environmental agencies' successful reli-
ance on limited data and poor science. Such reliance is sometimes neces-
sary because the governing statute required a decision in too short a time,
and there was simply an absence of good data on either side of the issue.
One such example, which I have often mentioned, was the EPA's deci-
sion to suspend, on an emergency basis, the pesticide registrations of two
herbicides during the height of the dioxin hysteria in the late 1970s. The
Agency based its ruling on seriously flawed epidemiological studies, con-
cluding that exposure of pregnant women to the chemicals was a causal
factor in spontaneous first trimester abortions. The federal court upheld
the EPA's action solely on the basis of the presumption of correctness
given to the EPA's decisions.15 The EPA, in its subsequent administra-
tive cancellation hearings, abandoned the spontaneous abortion theory,
15. Dow Chem. Co. v. Blum, 469 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
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and relied instead on the premise that exposure to the chemicals could
cause cancer, based on European epidemiological research on male rail-
road workers.
Our system of judicial review has produced a rather odd situation in
which, at the federal standard-setting level at least, the EPA's decisions,
even its substantively sound ones, tend to be overturned for what often
amount to insignificant procedural blunders. Likewise, EPA decisions
are rarely overturned because they are.wrong, even when they are wrong.
During my years in the Department of Justice, I recall telling newly
hired lawyers that "if your adversary has to argue the substance of our
client's rule, you will win."
The usual argument in favor of reliance on limited data and ques-
tionable scientific judgment is that an agency should be able to err on the
side of conservatism in the interest of preserving the public health.
While this argument has merit when an agency is making intelligent, in-
formed choices between competing sets of qualified scientific opinion, it
cannot credibly be asserted to justify ineptitude or blind reliance on pa-
tently bad science simply because there is nothing in the literature prov-
ing the negative.
The virtual retreat of the judicial branch from actively overseeing
executive branch formulation of environmental policy during the 1970s
was counterbalanced during the 1980s by a stunning turnabout. Con-
gress went from enacting its traditional broad, command-type legislation
to enacting highly detailed control-type legislation.
1 6
For example, the very specific performance criteria for landfills and
surface impoundments contained in The Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments of 1984 (HSWA)17 and the detailed requirements regulat-
ing hazardous air pollutants contained in the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 199018 are a radical departure from the old ways of determining
standards. They were not, however, premised upon the application of
better science or more rational policy decisions than the earlier decisions
made by the EPA in formulating its first round of RCRA regulations.
The HSWA "land ban" essentially represented a political decision to
eliminate the use of landfills as the primary technology employed for the
disposal of hazardous waste. One economic consequence of this decision
was a profound economic restructuring of the waste management indus-
try, a result that-does not appear to have been considered by Congress
16. See supra note 7 and accompanying text for a discussion of command and control
statutes.
17. Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.).
18. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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when it enacted HSWA. It is entirely possible that similar unforeseen
economic effects will result from the Clean Air Act Amendments. Con-
gress's trend during the 1980s to adopt specific environmental standards
by legislative fiat approximates the way that European governments tend
to make decisions.
I had not intended to talk about CERCLA, but I will do so briefly.
CERCLA epitomizes the very worst of government policy making. The
program was flawed from the start. The criteria and procedure for in-
cluding sites on the CERCLA National Priority List were poorly
designed, and resulted in the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dol-
lars on old landfills that simply did not warrant such treatment. The
process probably overlooked many serious problem areas while allowing,
for example, states such as New Jersey to include old sanitary landfills as
priority sites, presumably because the state hoped federal funds would be
available to effectuate final closure.
Even more troublesome is the EPA's inability to establish meaning-
ful clean-up standards, and to make the hard, intelligent decisions neces-
sary to avoid needless expenditures when the facts do not warrant them.
Lack of experience and fear of political disfavor created an atmosphere of
"be conservative to the extreme and you will not be faulted," thereby
assuring that money will, in the end, be spent.
CERCLA and its implementation were byproducts of the public
concerns of the day. Much environmental decision making has, unfortu-
nately, been reactive. A scientific report captures the fancy of popular
media, moving elected representatives to believe that they must address
the issue legislatively in order to show their constituency that it is being
well served. Executive branch appointees behave in a similar fashion.
The flurry of activity involving asbestos and radon gas during the 1980s
is a good example of reactive policy making. This activity consumed a
great deal of energy and money, and involved perceived risks that are
generally viewed, in retrospect, to have been overblown.
I do not intend to overstate the case. The EPA and state environ-
mental agencies have made a number of intelligent, courageous decisions,
and I am not one to argue that every regulatory decision that is expensive
or with which industry disagrees is wrong. I believe the EPA has made
many correct, though expensive, decisions, particularly in its implemen-
tation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.
I also do not mean to imply that the private sector uniformly
behaves rationally and with wisdom and good judgment. Unfortunately,
as environmental law has become big business, it has attracted newcom-
ers whose lack of adequate grounding in the policies and history of envi-
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ronmental programs produces frustrating and unproductive interactions
with agency personnel. The legal profession is no exception. I recall a
recent meeting with a state air pollution engineer in which, after a discus-
sion concerning a fine point, the engineer expressed relief at being able to
have a useful discussion about the subject, complaining that the "last five
lawyers" she had to deal with had no idea what the regulations were all
about.
My final comment on the substantive evolution of environmental
law is one with which I doubt anyone will disagree. Statutory environ-
mental law has "evolved" from the simple to the complex, from the
straightforward to the labyrinthine and arcane. Not only are our envi-
ronmental statutes among the most complex legislation, but the body of
administrative regulations is sufficiently full of nuances and unstated
premises that in many cases what is written does not necessarily mean
what it appears to say.
V. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL BAR
When lawyers refer to themselves as "environmental lawyers,"
what, precisely, does that mean? Does it mean that this person can and
does handle any and all matters that arguably fall within the body of law
that we call environmental law? One aspect of the maturation of the
subject area is that, almost certainly, that will not be the case.
Until 1980 those of us who called ourselves environmental lawyers
were people with similar backgrounds or experiences and, for the most
part, similar skills. To be sure, some of us had expertise others did not
have in unique areas like nuclear regulatory law and mining reclamation
law. But by and large, we were all basically grounded in government
regulatory law and, for some of us, litigation, and we learned our trade as
air and water lawyers. When solid waste regulation came along in the
late 1970s, the skills were transferable because the concepts were essen-
tially the same.
Also, before 1980 there were more full-time environmental lawyers
working for federal and state governments than in the private sector.
Most corporations did not have an environmental lawyer in the general
counsel's office, and except for a comparatively small number of law
firms, mostly in Washington, D.C., the private bar did not recognize en-
vironmental law as a money-making field of practice.
That all began to change after 1980. Two factors coincided to shift
the balance of the profession to the private sector. First was the exodus of
a large number of highly skilled environmental lawyers and engineers
into the private sector at the beginning of the Reagan Administration.
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This phenomenon was less the product of a distaste for Reagan's politics
than a realization by industry and its service providers that the environ-
mental programs that were built up in the 1970s were (a) not going away,
and (b) not straightforward, thus they needed legal advice to assure com-
pliance. The second primary motivating factor was the passage of CER-
CLA. Without a doubt, CERCLA created an environmental industry
almost overnight. The specter of unlimited liability spurred businesses to
spend money on environmental lawyers almost without limitation
throughout the 1980s.
CERCLA generated not only the phenomenon of "the CERCLA
lawyer," but the fear factor associated with the potential for direct
"lender liability" transmogrified even the most eager and bullish banker
in the otherwise heady lending climate of the mid-1980s into a nervous
and reluctant lender when industrial property was involved. Hence, the
"due diligence" environmental lawyer was born.
Thus, by 1985 or so we saw the emergence of three distinctly differ-
ent environmental bars. There was the original regulatory-litigation bar,
the CERCLA bar, and the due diligence bar. As I have mentioned, I
believe that the former are primarily lawyers who have more or less the
same grounding in the subject matter.
It was relatively easy to practice CERCLA law. Some have said
that all you had to do was master a few acronyms, get used to traveling,
and say a few intelligent things at the potentially responsible party (PRP)
meetings you attended. There was also plenty of opportunity to partici-
pate in multiparty CERCLA groups with little risk of embarrassment
due to lack of regulatory knowledge. After all, the rules were simple:
joint and several strict liability, and thus the private sector always pays.
CERCLA provided a golden opportunity for a labor lawyer, general liti-
gator, antitrust lawyer, et cetera, to become an "environmental lawyer."
I suspect that by 1990, CERCLA lawyers accounted for at least fifty
percent of those lawyers who called themselves environmental lawyers.
As has been said recently of bankruptcy practice, they have had "a few
good years," and may have a few more. But the CERCLA gravy train
may be slowing down, and it must eventually sputter to a halt. However,
unlike bankruptcy practice, which enjoys a cyclical "few good years,"
when the Superfund phenomenon is over, it will be over for good. The
experience gained by most lawyers whose principal activity has been han-
dling CERCLA cases for individual clients is not readily transferable
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into other areas of environmental law.1 9 CERCLA, even after its amend-
ment in 1986, is a simple law. It is not an environmental regulatory law,
and it may well be easier for most CERCLA lawyers to find something
totally different to do after CERCLA than to move into an environmen-
tal regulatory practice.
Because there were not enough trained environmental lawyers
around to fill all of the corporate due diligence slots that opened up in
law firms during the 1980s, a similar pattern of career changing occurred
in that subdiscipline. Corporate and banking lawyers were encouraged
to become environmental due diligence specialists. It was perceived that
clients would not be comfortable unless an environmental lawyer blessed
the deal. If a firm could not find an experienced environmental lawyer
20
it would make one by designating an associate or young partner as the
firm's environmental lawyer or would hire a young lawyer from an envi-
ronmental agency, assuming incorrectly that all government environ-
mental lawyers receive well-rounded, solid training in environmental
law.21 It turns out that this was-and continues to be-a dangerous
practice, both for law firms and clients.
Unlike CERCLA practice, where there is usually comfort (albeit not
strength) in numbers, an environmental corporate lawyer gives individ-
ual advice to an individual client whose exposure can be substantial if the
advice turns out to be wrong. Part of my own practice has involved
mergers and acquisitions and bank financing; therefore, I have been able
to observe this subset of environmental practitioners. Two observations
stand out. It is relatively easy for a bright lawyer to obtain a superficial
working knowledge of a broad range of environmental laws. Thus, if one
believes that merely determining whether an acquisition target or the
bank's customer has obtained all of the necessary environmental permits
is adequate, with the help of a good engineering consultant this veneer of
knowledge would be sufficient. That, however, is not enough. A rapidly
obtained superficial understanding of environmental law will not provide
even the smartest individual with adequate tools to evaluate whether the
target or customer has problems that will result in significant noncom-
pliance one, two, or five years down the road. Nor will it provide a basis
19. I do not include lawyers whose practice has largely been that of "common counsel" in
litigated cases. That activity amounts to handling complex litigation, a skill in its own right.
20. Even today, there is a lack of understanding, particularly among older corporate prac-
titioners, of what environmental lawyers do.
21. Although this was true during the early years of our profession, it is not true today. A
young lawyer hired by an EPA regional office, for example, might spend three years handling
the same, very narrow, range of matters, such as polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) cases under
TSCA or CERCLA in one state.
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for determining if the target or customer will be financially prepared in
the future to meet a regulatory obligation which is unclear on the face of
the written regulations. These are issues that corporate due diligence
lawyers have tended to ignore.
There is also a tendency to recycle the same language over and over
for representations and warranties, covenants, and environmental indem-
nities. One of the first telephone calls I received from a corporate partner
at a firm I had just joined was a request to send up "the standard envi-
ronmental language" for an asset purchase. There was consternation on
the other end of the conversation when I told my new partner that there
was no such thing as standard environmental language, and that if I was
to be useful to our client, I needed to understand the business of the
entity to be acquired and the key elements of the deal.
So far as I am aware, the basic outline for environmental provisions
in bank credit agreements was developed during the mid-1980s from
early language put together by my former partner, Jim Cahan. I have
subsequently seen that language appear in deal papers generated by law-
yers all over the United States. Interestingly, we did not assume at the
time that this was a "one size fits all" exercise, but, lawyers being law-
yers, there have been many attempts at applying it that way. I am now
beginning to see new transactions in which the environmental terms ne-
gotiated in the early and mid-1980s in prior deals are coming to light,
and there are a few instances of litigation involving the adequacy of envi-
ronmental due diligence. I am repeatedly amazed at the persistence of
naive approaches to identifying and addressing environmental liabilities
taken in transactions that closed even after 1990. I suspect that there are
more than a few financial time bombs sitting in the closing binders of
many deals of the 1980s.
VI. WHERE ARE WE HEADED?
Perhaps what I have liked most about my career as an environmen-
tal lawyer is that I have never been bored. I have never had to say, "It's
going to be like this for the next twenty years, this is what we do and it
will always be this way." The field has changed too fast for that, and its
increasing complexity has presented sufficient intellectual challenges to
keep even the most restless of us intrigued.
Where are we headed? We might see the contained globalization of
environmental law. Whether lawyers, as opposed to engineers or ac-
countants, will play a significant role in places like Europe, Asia, and
South America is an interesting question. Whether we like to admit it or
not, all good environmental lawyers engage in a little bit of armchair
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engineering, and all environmental engineers practice law without a li-
cense. This situation is not unlike the relationship of tax lawyers and
accountants, and the way environmental policy is implemented in other
societies will in some cases favor participation by lawyers and in others it
will not.
We may see the demise of CERCLA as we know it. We may see a
resurgence of air and water pollution work. The trend toward private
litigation over contaminated property may continue. Some of us may
become specialized management consultants, helping corporations imple-
ment ambitious environmental, health, and safety programs. Our profes-
sion may continue to balkanize into subspecialties. The center of gravity,
which had shifted from Washington, D.C. by 1982, may continue to
move toward the states except for federal-centered programs. Finally, it
will be interesting to see if the federal air and water pollution rule-mak-
ing initiatives of the 1990s experience the same degree of appellate litiga-
tion that occurred in connection with the rule makings of the 1970s.
Industry in this country is significantly more astute and sophisti-
cated about environmental compliance today than it was twenty-five, or
even fifteen, years ago. Every major corporation employs a significant
number of environmental professionals. It is fair to assume that at least
some of the fights over EPA rules that followed the 197222 and 197723
water pollution laws and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 197724 were
the result of unsophisticated and, in some cases, unfounded concerns
about the impact of those rules. Mistakes like that are not likely to be
made by industry today. The disputes that we are now seeing between
government and industry are more subtle, and sometimes involve highly
sophisticated contrary interpretations of data and longer-term analysis of
economic or social impacts. Thus, to the extent that there will be litiga-
tion over environmental policy in the future, it is likely to be about very
difficult issues.
The balance of technical environmental knowledge seems to have
shifted over the last quarter century from government toward industry.
With that shift there has also been a shift in the fundamental corporate
attitude toward environmental regulation in at least some of the major
industry groups from how not to comply to how to do better than what is
22. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.A.).
23. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993)).
24. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
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required. This factor will undoubtedly affect the future development of
environmental law in some way.
Finally, the greatest question of all remains unanswered. After
spending trillions of dollars, creating a large environmental protection
industry, and writing tens of thousands of pages of legislation, have we
significantly improved the natural environment? Have we stopped the
degradation of the air and the water? Have we received value for our
expenditures? And will all of it matter if we cannot affect what the
Brazilians, the Peruvians, and the Chinese do with their resources, and
consequently to the air and oceans?
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